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THE CASE OF CHRISTMAS ISLAND:  







In July of 2011, Australia and Malaysia entered an 
arrangement in which Australian asylum seekers would be removed 
to neighboring Malaysia to have their asylum claims processed.1 
Following widespread criticism in the media, Australia’s High Court 
(“High Court” or “Court”) ruled that such a deal violated Australia’s 
refuges protection laws.2 While this ruling should have put an end to 
the deal, Australia’s Immigration Minister, Chris Bowen, indicated 
that the agreement might nevertheless be feasible.3 Policy makers 
                                                 

 J.D. Candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State 
University. 
1 See Matt Siegel, Plan to Deal With Seekers of Asylum Roils Australia, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A7. 
2 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32  (Austl.); British Broadcasting 
Corporation, Australia Court Rules Out Refugee ‘Swap’ with Malaysia, BBC NEWS, Aug. 
31, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14727471; Crystal Ja & 
Julian Drape, Opponents Demand Government Rule Out Malaysia Deal, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD, Sept. 7, 2011, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-
national/oppn-demands-govt-rule-out-malaysia-deal-20110907-1jwh4.html. 
3 See Madeleine Coorey, Australia’s Malaysia Refugee Swap Under Fire, AFP, 
Sept. 16, 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g—
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proposed amending Australian domestic immigration laws to allow 
the deal to go forward unencumbered; and a bill to amend Australia’s 
Migration Act was subsequently introduced.4 
This comment addresses the conflict and interplay between 
Australia’s internal laws and its international obligations. Part I of this 
comment describes the origin and structure of the Malaysian refugee 
deal.5 The existing legality of the third party schemes under 
Australia’s current immigration system is then examined in Part II.6 
The High Court has not only expounded on third party schemes in 
general, but has also ruled on the legality of the 2011 Malaysian deal. 
The High Court’s holding and rationale is taken up in Part III.7 Given 
Australia’s international obligations as a State Party to the United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee 
Convention” or “Convention”), Part IV and V will then explore the 
wrongfulness of such a deal under standards of international law and 
effective protection.8 To further this analysis, Part VI will examine 
Malaysia’s treatment of refugees.9 As it currently stands, Australian 
law and international obligations are in agreement: the Malaysian deal 
would be improper. However, officials within the Australian 
government propose disrupting this synchronicity by amending the 
country’s internal laws to allow for such a deal. It is thus necessary to 
look at how these two bodies of governance work in synergy. Part 
VII addresses whether amending Australia’s Migration Act would 
fulfill the country’s international obligations.10 
The deal has significance for both Australia and the 
international community. The Australian government’s continued 
insistence of the deal’s legality, despite the High Court’s ruling, 
presents a challenge to future asylum seekers in Australia. On a 
broader scale, the deal raises a question regarding the interplay 
                                                 
d3pIxV72sQf8rsMPnO4dRF2nQ?docId=CNG.79d23623538adc9507ec3c37e5062
f1b.251. 
4 See id. 
5 See infra Part I. 
6 See infra Part II. 
7 See infra Part III. 
8 See infra Part IV, V. 
9 See infra Part VI. 
10 See infra Part VII. 
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between domestic and international law.11 The proposal of amending 
Australia’s immigration laws is premised on the idea that domestic 
law trumps international obligations.12 This rationale raises concerns 
about member states’ obligations under the U.N. Refugee 
Convention. 
I. THE MALAYSIAN DEAL AND ITS ORIGINS 
Australia receives about two percent of the world’s asylum 
claims.13 In 2010, only 8,250 immigrants applied as asylum seekers 
within the country.14 By comparison, 55,530 noncitizens sought 
asylum in the United States in 2010.15 However, it is not the lack of 
asylum seekers that have given rise to this controversy. Because of its 
proximity to Burma, Australia has become a popular destination for 
immigrants arriving by sea from Southeast Asia.16 Dubbed the “boat 
                                                 
11 Scholars have recently addressed Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 
of 2011 in different lights. See Michelle Foster, Reflections on a Decade of International 
Law: International Legal Theory: Snapshots From a Decade Of International Legal Life: The 
Implications Of the Failed ‘Malaysian Solution’: The Australian High Court and Refugee 
Responsibility Sharing At International Law, 13 MELB. J. INT’L L. 395, 422 (2012) 
(explaining that, according to the Migration Act as it presently stands, any future 
offshore processing arrangement undertaken by Australia must accord with 
Australia’s international legal obligations); see also Hannah Stewart-Weeks, Out of 
Sight But Not Out of Mind: Plaintiff M61/2010E v. Commonwealth, 33 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 831, 843-46 (2011) (arguing that the Migration Act would not necessarily have 
to be amended because section 198A(3) provides a way for the Minister to declare a 
country safe if it “meets relevant human rights standards in providing protection”). 
12 See Katina Curtis, No Deal Yet on Asylum Seekers, SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD, Dec. 23, 2011, http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/no-
deal-yet-on-asylum-seekers-20111223-1p7mm.html. 
13  See U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY, ASYLUM LEVELS AND TRENDS IN 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 2010 15 (2011), 
 http://www.unhcr.org/4d8c5b109.html. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See Tony Keim, Accused People Smugglers’ Boat Stranded at Sea, THE 
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people,” these immigrants have garnered attention both in the media 
and within the Australian government.17 
Christmas Island, an Australian territory located in the Indian 
Ocean, has been designated as an “excised offshore place.”18On this 
island, unlawful noncitizens, who have come to Australia via 
“offshore entry,” are detained.19 On July 25, 2011, the Australian and 
Malaysian governments devised a plan by which 800 asylum seekers, 
who had yet to have their claims assessed in Australia, would be sent 
to Malaysia for processing.20 The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) would then evaluate 
these asylum seekers’ claims in Malaysia.21 
The Australian government justified the deal as a valid 
exercise of power under sections 198(2) and 198A(1) of the 
Migration Act of 1958.22 Section 198(2) provides that an immigration 
officer must remove noncitizens who are determined to be unlawfully 
present “as soon as reasonably possible,” but does not indicate the 
location to which these Asylum seekers should be removed.23 Section 
198A further provides that Australia may remove “offshore entry 
person[s]” to safe third countries.24 Under this provision, for a 
country to be a valid port, it must meet “relevant” human rights 
                                                 
17 Nick Butterly & Andrew Probyn Canberra, Gillard Turns the Boat Jeat on 
Abbott, THE WEST AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 24, 2011, 
http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/breaking/10329656/gillard-turns-the-
boat-heat-on-abbott/. 
18 See DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, FACT SHEET 
81 - AUSTRALIA’S EXCISED OFFSHORE PLACES (2010). 
19 See DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP, supra note 19; 
see also Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 5(1) (Austl.) (defining a non-citizen as any 
individual who has been determined not to be an Australian citizen and an 
“offshore entry person” as a non-citizen who has entered unlawfully at an excised 
offshore place). 
20 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011, (2011) HCA 32, at 
¶ 8; Siegel, supra note 1. 
21 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, [2011] HCA 32, at ¶ 8. 
22 See id. 
23 Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198(2) (Austl.). 
24 Id. § 198A(1). 
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standards.25 Furthermore, such a third country must also provide 
protection to persons seeking asylum or returning to their countries 
of origin.26 
While on its face the deal represents an outsourcing scheme 
to avoid the consumption of government resources, justification for 
the deal has been political rather than administrative.27 By refusing to 
house asylum seekers within Australia, the government hopes to 
deter immigrants from seeking illegal channels of entry.28 
While outsourcing refugee processing might appear to be an 
uncommon solution, this deal hardly marks the first time Australia 
has attempted to implement such a scheme.29 In 2001, a Norwegian 
carrier ship, the MV Tampa, rescued 438 distressed Afghans from 
fishing vessels in international waters.30 The rescued noncitizens 
subsequently sought asylum from the Australian government.31 On 
September 10, 2001, Australia’s Minister of Defense and the 
President of the Republic of Nauru devised the “Pacific Solution”, 
under which the asylum seekers were removed to the Polynesian 
island nation to have their claims processed.32 
                                                 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See Press Release, Australian Human Rights Commission, Sending 
Asylum Seekers To Malaysia Is Not The Answer To Addressing People Smuggling 
(July 25, 2011),  
 http://humanrights.gov.au/about/media/media_releases/2011/61_11.html). 
28 See id. 
29 See Susan Kneebone, The Pacific Plan: The Provision of “Effective 
Protection?”, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 696 (2006); see also Savitri Taylor, Protection 
Elsewhere/Nowhere, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 283 (2006). 
30 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 13. 
31 See id. 
32 See Kneebone, supra note 30, at 696; Taylor, supra note 30 (for a 
discussion of Australia’s previous third-country arrangements). 
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II. LEGALITY OF THIRD PARTY SCHEMES UNDER AUSTRALIA’S 
MIGRATION ACT 
Australian officials have proposed that they can circumvent 
Australian law and allow for the third party deal by amending 
Australia’s Migration Act.33 An initial question therefore is whether 
the deal does in fact violate Australian law. 
A 1992 amendment to Australia’s Migration Act established 
grounds for the mandatory detention and removal of noncitizens.34 
Under the Migration Act, unlawful noncitizens detained under 
section 178 must be kept in immigration detention until they are 
removed from Australian borders.35 If the noncitizen is given a final 
status determination of unlawful presence, s/he must then be 
removed “as soon as reasonably practical.”36 
Australia’s Migration Act provides for these asylum seekers to 
be sent to territories other than their countries of origin.37 Under 
Section 91D of the Migration Act, such plans are designated as “safe 
third country” schemes.38 The Minister of Immigration has the ability 
to designate a third country as being “safe,” and thus a proper port of 
removal.39 An asylum claimant, who has a right to reside in a third 
country, cannot validly apply for a visa based on protection in 
Australia.40 In addition, Australia would not have any protection 
obligations to such an individual.41 Because a third country to which a 
person has residence ties will have the obligation of assessing his 
                                                 
33 See Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and Other 
Measures) of 2011, (Cth) (Austl.); see also Curtis, supra note 13. 
34 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) §§ 188-197 (Austl.). 
35 See id. §§ 177-78 (defining a ‘designated person’ who is to be detained). 
36 See Plaintiff M61 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2010) 
85 ALJR 133, 139-140 (Austl.).  
37 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 91D (Austl.). 
38 See id. 
39 See id. § 91D(3). 
40 See id. §§ 91C(1)(b)(ii), 91E. 
41 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 45 (Austl.). 
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asylum claim, this provision prevents immigrants from “forum 
shopping” for the most lenient admissions system.42 
Section 198A of the Migration Act requires that a declaration 
be made in relation to the third country to which a migrant will be 
sent.43 Australian courts have held that such a declaration must be 
made by the Minister of Immigration in “good faith.”44 Furthermore, 
any declaration must be based on an objective evaluation that a 
designated country is “safe” to send migrants.45 The declaration must 
also comport with obligations under the Refugee Convention.46 For a 
country to be declared “safe,” migrants must be given protection 
both while their claims are being processed and after a final 
determination of their claims has been made.47 
III.  THE HIGH COURT’S RESPONSE TO THE MALAYSIAN DEAL 
While Australia’s Migration Act does allow for certain safe 
third country schemes,48 the High Court has rejected its use in the 
present deal.49 Up until the High Court’s ruling rejecting the 
Malaysian deal, Australian courts generally held that the third-party 
state need not be a party to the Refugee Convention before a transfer 
could take place.50 However, in Plaintiff M70 and M106, the High 
Court ruled that Australia must consider the recipient country’s 
domestic laws and obligations under international law when declaring 
                                                 
42 Penelope Mathew, Current Development: Australian Refugee Protection in the 
Wake of the Tampa, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 661, 672-673 (2002). 
43 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198A(3) (Austl.). 
44 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Eshetu, (1999) 197 
CLR 611, 654 (Austl.). 
45 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198A(3) (Austl.) (establishing the 
criteria used to evaluate a third country as safe). 
46 See id. § 198A(3)(iv). 
47 See id. §§ 198A(3)(ii)-(iii).  
48 See id. § 91D. 
49 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32 at ¶ 66-67. 
50 See, e.g., Kola v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
(2002) 120 FCR 170, 178 (Austl.). 
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a country to be “safe.”51 When confronted with the issue of whether 
Australia could deport asylum seekers to Malaysia for processing, the 
Court held that migrants, who claim a fear of persecution by their 
countries of origin, may only be taken from Australia pursuant to 
section 198A.52 If no power under section 198A exists, the person 
may only be validly removed once their claims are assessed and found 
to be lacking.53 If, however, the migrant is ultimately determined to 
be a refugee, the person may only be removed pursuant to the non-
refoulement provisions under section 198(2).54 
Section 198A requires certain standards to be met before 
offshore entry persons may be taken to a designated country.55 A 
country of deportation must provide effective procedures for 
assessing asylum claims.56 Protections must be afforded to refugees57, 
as well as noncitizens who are waiting for their claims to be 
processed.58 A third country must also meet “relevant” human rights 
standards in dispensing its protection to refugees and asylum 
seekers.59 
Previous High Court precedent supports the fact that the 
government owes a “protection obligation” to those asserting asylum 
claims under Article 36, Section 2 of the Migration Act.60 Article 36 
states that the criterion for a protection visa in Australia is that “the 
applicant for the visa is a noncitizen in Australia to whom Australia 
has a protection obligation under [the Convention].”61 
                                                 
51 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 66. 
52 See id. 
53 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 54. 
54 See id. at ¶ 51. 
55 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth.) § 198A(3)(a) (Austl.). 
56 See id. § 198A(3)(a)(i). 
57 See id. § 198A(3)(a)(ii). 
58 See id. § 198A(3)(a)(iii). 
59 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 198A(3)(a)(vi) (Austl.). 
60 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, 213 ALR 668, at ¶ 42 (Austl.). 
61 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 36(2) (Austl.). 
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In NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the High Court explained the 
fundamental difference between those noncitizens who have entered 
the country and those who have not.62 Because customary 
international law involves rights between states rather than 
individuals, an asylum seeker cannot assert a right to enter a country 
where an individual is not a national.63 However, Australia’s 
Migration Act fills in the gap left by international law. Section 36(2) 
assumes that “obligation[s] are owed. . . by Contracting States to 
individuals” as well as to other member states.64 Under Section 36(2), 
a protection obligation is owed to those who assert an asylum claim.65 
An asylum applicant can take himself out of the class of noncitizens 
to whom Australia owes a protection obligation under the Migration 
Act by committing certain crimes.66 However, simply because a 
noncitizen has not had his asylum claim adjudicated does not mean 
that no protection obligations exist under Section 36.67 Similarly, in 
Plaintiff M61, the Court explained that the Migration Act is premised 
on the idea that Australia has a “protection obligation to 
individuals.”68 The Court held that the Migration Act is structured in 
such a way that the international obligations towards refugees are 
mirrored by Australia’s domestic law.69 
                                                 
62 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 58. 
63 See id. 
64 Id. at ¶ 27; see also Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 36(2) (Austl.). 
65 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth.) § 36(2) (Austl.); NAGV and NAGW 
of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, 
[2005] HCA 6, at ¶ 33. 
66 See Migration Act of 1958, (Cth) § 91U (Austl.); see also Migration 
Reform Act of 1992, (Cth) § 4(b) (Austl.). 
67 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶¶ 2, 9 (Austl.). 
68 Plaintiff M61 v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, (2010) 85 
ALJR at 139. 
69 Id. 
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IV. LEGALITY IN LIGHT OF AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 
In order to be consistent with the principles of the Refugee 
Convention, asylum seekers, who turn to foreign governments 
because their own countries are unable or unwilling to provide them 
with protection,70 should be assured these governments will not in 
turn cast them out. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention adopts this 
idea of non-refoulement, stating that a contracting state will not 
“expel or return” a refugee to a country in which his life or freedom 
“would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”71 
The principle of non-refoulement has long been espoused as 
a necessary protection for asylum seekers.72 On its face, the plain 
language of Article 33 prohibits refoulement to a refugee’s country of 
origin, which poses a threat to his life or freedom.73 However, the 
principle of non-refoulement under Article 33 has subsequently been 
extended to include a prohibition against chain refoulement.74 If an 
asylum seeker is sent to a third country, it must not, in turn, deport 
the noncitizen back to the home from which he is seeking 
protection.75 Third countries might likewise be improper if the 
noncitizen only temporarily resided in such a country and would 
therefore likely be deported for failing to establish residence ties.76 
The principle of non-refoulement extends past the Refugee 
Convention. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has indicated 
that practices among countries that are widespread enough to 
constitute an international custom can be accepted as international 
                                                 
70 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 
2198 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/187, at art. 1 (Dec. 18, 2001). 
71 See id. at art. 2. 
72 See id. at art. 33. 
73 See id. 
74 Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of 
Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
PPLA/2003/01 (Feb. 2003). 
75 Id. 
76 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 
71, at art. 33. 
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law.77 The United Nations has declared that the principle of non-
refoulement constitutes a rule of international customary law.78 
Because of the widespread incorporation of non-refoulement 
provisions in regional and worldwide treaties, the UN has asserted 
that the principle has come to constitute an international custom as 
well as a rule of international law.79 The UNHCR further pointed to 
the inclusion of non-refoulement in the reaffirmed 1967 UN 
Declaration on Territorial Asylum as evidence that the principle has 
risen to the level of international customary law.80 
Two types of states exist in regards to non-refoulement 
obligations: those countries which are State Parties to the 
international human rights treaties; and those states which have not 
yet acceded to treaty obligations.81 For State Parties to the Refugee 
Convention, there is a delineated obligation under the treaty’s 
language to protect asylum seekers from refoulement.82 For states, 
which are not parties to either the Refugee Convention or its 
protocol, the principle of non-refoulement must nevertheless be 
respected because it has attained the status of customary international 
law.83 The ICJ has explained that states have an obligation to act in 
conformity with customary law on the international stage.84 If a state 
deviates from such courses of conduct, it will be treated as being in 
breach of such rules, rather than as a forerunner in the creation of a 
                                                 
77 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993, at art. 38, ¶ 1. 
78 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The Principle of Non-
Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed to 
UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 
BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, Jan. 31, 1994, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/437b6db64.html. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 79. 
84 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 425 (June 27). 
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new international standard.85 The state’s action will be considered to 
be prima facie evidence that a rule has been violated.86 
Australia’s High Court has extended the concept of non-
refoulement to safe third country schemes.87 In NAVG, the Minister 
of Immigration argued that the principle of non-refoulement under 
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention only protected noncitizens 
from deportation to their countries of origin.88 Article 33, therefore, 
did not place any limitations on sending noncitizens to countries 
other than their homelands.89 The High Court firmly rejected this 
reasoning.90 The Court explained that non-refoulement was a broad 
enough concept to include protection from asylum seekers being sent 
to countries where their lives or freedoms would be threatened.91 The 
Court further explained that Article 33 of the Refugee Convention 
should also be read in the negative.92 Thus, if a country is “bound by 
a non-refoulement obligation” with respect to a given asylum 
applicant, and there is no country to which the applicant can be 
removed without the obligation being breached, “the State in 
question has no choice but to tolerate that individual’s presence 
within its territory.”93 Thus, a state might have an obligation to 
                                                 
85 See id. 
86 See id. at 427. 
87 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 25. 
88 See id. at ¶ 24. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at ¶ 91 (“If the Minister’s argument were accepted. . . it would 
seem to follow that Australia would never have owed protection obligations to any 
person.”). 
91 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 25; see also U.N. High 
Commissioner For Refugees, The Scope And Content of the Principle Of Non-Refoulement, 
June 20, 2001,  
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=
3b33574d1 (discussing how third country schemes fall under the auspices of Article 
33 of the Convention. Not only does Article 33 require that a State Party consider 
whether a claimant’s life and freedom would be threatened, but also the possibility 
of chain migration). 
92 See NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, (2005) HCA 6, at ¶ 23. 
93 Id. at ¶ 22. 
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protect a noncitizen simply because no other proper and safe country 
exists.94 
While Australia must adhere to the Refugee Convention’s 
non-refoulement principles, the High Court has held that third 
country schemes are not per se prohibited under the terms of the 
Convention.95 In Thiyagarajah, a Sri Lankan applicant in Australia had 
previously been granted refugee status and permanent residence in 
France.96 The respondent was furthermore eligible to apply for 
French citizenship.97 The High Court held that, because France 
would provide effective protection to the respondent, deporting him 
to the third country was consistent with Australia’s obligations under 
the Convention.98 The Federal Court subsequently expanded on the 
High Court’s reasoning, holding that a safe country could be 
designated by an applicant having minimal ties to a territory, such as 
being granted a temporary right to re-enter a third country.99 
The UNHCR has similarly explained that safe third country 
schemes do not represent a violation of a State Party’s obligations 
under the Convention.100 The Executive Committee of the UNHCR 
has conceded that if an asylum seeker has preexisting “connection[s] 
or close links” with another state, deportation to that country might 
be allowed.101 The appropriateness of this deportation, however, is 
dependent on whether it is “fair and reasonable” to expect the 
applicant to first request asylum from the third country.102 
                                                 
94 See id. 
95 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Thiyagarajah, 
(1997) 80 FCR 543, 563 (Austl.). 
96 See id. at 565. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. at 563. 
99 See Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
1998 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 651, ¶ 11 (Austl.). 
100 See U.N. Human Right Commission, Refugees Without an Asylum 
Country, Conclusion No. 15 (XXX), (A/34/12/Add.1) (Oct. 16, 1979) [hereinafter 
Refugees Without an Asylum Country]. 
101 Id. 
102 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Thiyagaraja, 
(1997) 80 FCR at 563. 
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V. EFFECTIVE PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Australian courts have clearly interpreted the Convention to 
allow for the deportation of noncitizens who have valid claims to 
asylum.103 However, previous case law indicates that a third country 
must be able to provide an asylum seeker with effective protection.104 
The High Court in Thiyagarajah ultimately held that France was a 
proper third country to which the noncitizen could be deported 
without a substantive consideration of his asylum claim.105 But, the 
determining factor in the case was not only that the respondent had 
previously been granted status in France, but also that the third 
country would provide him with effective protection.106 The High 
Court affirmed the reasoning of the Full Court when it noted that it 
was highly unlikely that the applicant would be in danger of chain 
refoulement if deported to France.107 
Effective protection is a safeguard designed to protect not 
only noncitizens who have already been granted asylum but also 
applicants who assert asylum claims.108 Claiming a credible fear from 
a country of origin affords an applicant with certain minimum 
safeguards while their claims are being adjudicated.109 The means by 
which these safeguards are provided are left open by the terms of the 
Refugee Convention.110 The UNHCR has acknowledged that varying 
                                                 
103 See id. 
104 See generally Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs, (1998) 86 FCR 526 (Austl.). 
105 See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Thiyagaraja, 
(1997) 80 FCR at 563. 
106 See id. 
107 See id.; see generally Rajendran v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs, (1998) 86 FCR 526 (Austl.). 
108 See U.N. Refugee Agency, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial 
Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, at 2-3 (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/45f17a1a4.pdf. 
109 See id.  
110 See U.N. Human Right Commission, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, line 191, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV (1992) [hereinafter Handbook 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees]. 
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methods of adjudicating claims, including integrating the processing 
of asylum claims into the general immigration system, might 
nevertheless be in line with a country’s obligations under the Refugee 
Convention.111 
While each State Party is given leave to implement its own 
procedures for adjudicating claims based on its particular judicial and 
administrative structure,112 the UNHCR has nevertheless 
promulgated minimum procedural standards which must be met.113 
The Executive Committee of UNHCR has explained that “fair and 
effective protection” includes procedures minimally sufficient to 
allow for the identification of noncitizens that should benefit from 
protection under the terms of the Refugee Convention.114 For 
example, it is not sufficient to designate a third country as “safe” 
based solely on whether that country is a State Party to the Refugee 
Convention.115 Instead, a hallmark of effective protection is whether 
a third country’s asylum processing system is fair to applicants.116 The 
U.N.’s General Counsel has recommended that a fair system of 
asylum adjudication must include a determination of claims by an 
impartial authority and an effective system of appeal.117 
At the twenty-eighth session of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme in October, 1977, the Executive Committee delineated 
certain minimum procedural requirements that would constitute 
effective protection of asylum applicants.118 Asylum seekers should 
first and foremost be given necessary information about the 
procedures they need to follow to assert asylum claims.119 Interpreters 
should be provided to applicants while they are submitting their 
                                                 
111 See id. 
112 See id. 
113 See Refugees Without an Asylum Country, supra note 101, at 2. 
114 See id. 
115 See Legomsky, supra note 75, at 7. 
116 See Refugees Without an Asylum Country, supra note 101. 
117 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111, 
at line 192. 
118 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Determination of Refugee 
Status, No. 8 (XXVIII), A/32/12/Add.1 (Oct. 12, 1977). 
119 See id. at e(ii). 
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claims to the appropriate officials.120 While countries often do not 
recognize the right of an applicant to have appointed counsel, 
noncitizens seeking asylum should nevertheless be granted an 
adequate opportunity to obtain counsel.121 Finally, while an 
applicant’s claim is pending an initial determination or appeal, the 
asylum seeker should not be removed from the country from which 
he is seeking protection.122 
Under best practice procedures, a determination of whether a 
country is “safe” and will provide asylum seekers effective protection 
should be individualized.123 An examination should be conducted by 
a state to determine whether the third country would not apply more 
restrictive criteria in adjudicating a particular claim than the country 
the applicant is already in.124 The Executive Committee of the 
UNHCR has acknowledged that the prevailing legal standard among 
countries places the burden of proof in establishing asylum on the 
noncitizen submitting the claim.125 However, asylum applicants rarely 
flee their homelands carrying documentation of their persecution.126 
Given that the sole evidence for many applicants will be their own 
testimony, the Executive Committee has explained that the duty to 
ascertain all relevant facts is shared between an applicant and 
                                                 
120 See id. at e(iv). 
121 See id. 
122 See id. at e(vii). 
123 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111, 
at line 29; see also Joanne van Selm, Access to Procedures ‘Safe Third Countries’, ‘Safe 
Countries of Origin’ and ‘Time Limits’, UNHCR, June 2001, 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=
3b39a2403 (discussing how countries are classified as safe under the human rights 
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124 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum Processes (Fair 
and Efficient Asylum Procedures), ¶ 4, EC/GC/01/12 (May 31, 2001). 
125 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111, 
at line 196. 
126 See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Annotations for 
Articles 1 to 19 of the Draft Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the Qualification of 
Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need 
International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, Dec. 2002, at 6, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/437cafaa4.html. 
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government examiners.127 For a country to have effective procedural 
protections, the system of adjudicating claims must take into account 
and make allowances for unsupported yet credible statements by 
applicants.128 
The UNHCR does not stand alone in its emphasis on the 
effective processing of asylum claims. The ICJ has similarly linked the 
principle of non-refoulement to a third country having an adequate 
system of adjudicating asylum claims.129 In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 
a noncitizen claiming asylum from Afghanistan entered the European 
Union through Greece.130 The Afghani finally made his way to 
Belgium, where he was detained.131 He was then transferred back to 
Greece to have his asylum claim processed.132 The Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights held that Belgium breached 
its obligation of non-refoulement under Article 3 of the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”).133 The court emphasized that shortcomings in 
a third country’s system of processing asylum claims alone could 
violate a deporting state’s international obligations of non-
refoulement.134 The court explained that Belgium “knew or ought to 
have known” that the noncitizen, when deported to Greece, had “no 
guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously examined by 
the Greek authorities.”135 In designating Greece as an improper third 
country, the court pointed to deficiencies in the Greek system of 
processing asylum claims, including claimants not receiving adequate 
                                                 
127 See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 111, 
at line 196. 
128 See id. 
129 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,  App. No. 30696/09,  Eur. Ct. 
H.R., 4  (2011), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d39bc7f2.html. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 84 (2011). 
134 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,  App. No. 30696/09,  Eur. Ct. 
H.R., 75 (2011). 
135 Id. at 75; See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: 
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information from Greek officials, a shortage of interpreters, and 
claimants not being given sufficient opportunity to secure legal aid.136 
Because of backlogs in the Greek asylum processing system, 
excessive delays in both initial asylum determinations and subsequent 
appeals were further indicated as negative factors in Greece’s 
immigration system.137 
VI. MALAYSIA’S TREATMENT OF REFUGEES 
International standards and safeguards indicate that a third 
country will be considered improper based on deficiencies in its 
processing of asylum claims alone.138 For Malaysia to therefore 
constitute a proper third country, standards of protection articulated 
by the international community must be met.139 In order to determine 
whether Malaysia would constitute an effective third country, it is 
necessary to examine Malaysia’s system of processing asylum claims, 
as well as its treatment of asylum seekers. 
One of the initial and resounding objections by the media to 
the Malaysian deal was that Malaysia had yet to become a member of 
the Refugee Convention.140 Being a member of the Convention does 
not simply mean that a country acknowledges the need to uphold 
human rights standards for those seeking asylum.141 The UNHCR 
also casts a net of supervision142 over the member states.143 The 
regulations put in place by the Convention were designed to provide 
a uniform system of asylum protection and adjudication between 
                                                 
136 See M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,  App. No. 30696/09,  Eur. Ct. 
H.R., 111 (2011). 
137 See id. at 39. 
138 See id. at 75. 
139 See id. 
140 See British Broadcasting Corporation, supra note 2; see also Ja & Drape, 
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141 See Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra 
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142 See id. at 4. 
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member states.144In fact, the concept of safe third countries 
originated as a way for member states with common protection 
obligations to share the burden of processing asylum claims.145 
Because Malaysia is not a State Party to the Refugee 
Convention, it does not have an obligation to comply with the 
minimum protections listed in the treaty as would a member state.146 
Moreover, the country does not legally recognize the status of 
“refugee” under its domestic laws.147 The UNHCR has indicated that 
the country does not have any “constitutional, legislative or 
administrative provisions dealing with the right to seek asylum or the 
protection of refugees.”148 This lack of legal recognition means that a 
system has not been established for providing protection for the 
specific processing and protection needs of refugees.149 No 
protection is provided for noncitizens that are ultimately determined 
to be unlawful and expelled to their countries of origin.150 
Under Malaysian law, anyone entering the country without 
appropriate documentation is subject to mandatory imprisonment for 
a maximum period of five years and a fine not exceeding RM10,000 
(approximately $3,000 USD).151 Under Section 6 of Malaysia’s 
Immigration Act of 1959/63, an unlawful noncitizen is also subject 
                                                 
144 See Plaintiff M70/2011 and Plaintiff M106 of 2011 v. Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship, (2011) HCA 32, at ¶ 117 (“What is clear is that 
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to whipping of not more than six strokes.152 Since the Malaysian 
Immigration Act was amended in 2002, the Malaysian government 
reported in June 2009 that 47,914 noncitizens had been subjected to 
physical punishment for immigration offenses.153 Amnesty 
International has similarly estimated that as many as 10,000 
immigrant prisoners are caned in the country annually.154 
In some ways, the Malaysian government has not been blind 
to the holes existing in its immigration policy. The UNHCR has 
noted that Malaysia has shown a “considerable degree of 
cooperation” with UNHCR officials.155 The country has not impeded 
humanitarian organizations that enter the country and provide 
assistance to the refugee population.156 Those already granted refugee 
status by the UNHCR are not deported and are generally given 
preferential treatment in detention centers.157 Likewise, those with 
UNHCR cards were given access to health care and limited access to 
NGO clinics.158 The country, however, does not provide access to 
formal education, even to noncitizens with UNHCR cards.159 
Yet, this situational compliance does not alleviate the broader 
and deeper problems in Malaysia’s refugee policy. In the Annual 
World Refugee Survey, the UNHCR characterized Malaysia’s refugee 
processing as a system comprised of “arbitrary arrest[s], detention[s] 
and deportation[s]” of refugees.160 Malaysia’s immigration system 
furthermore does not seem to take into account the danger of chain 
refoulement.161 The UNHCR noted that during 2008, Malaysia 
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deported at least 1,000 asylum seekers to Thailand, which has been 
known to refoule noncitizens to Myanmar.162 
Malaysia’s adjudication of asylum claims has been criticized as 
including inconsistencies and corruption. In the 2008 Annual World 
Refugee Survey, the UNHCR described how authorities in 
immigration holding facilities do not permit detainees to make phone 
calls upon their arrest.163 In order to inform anyone of their arrest or 
to seek aid, the detainees generally had to bribe police officers.164 
Malaysia also has a history of not following the letter of its 
international obligations.165 Despite Malaysia being a State Party to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the country does not 
provide primary education opportunities or free health services to 
most asylum seeking children.166 The UNHCR has further observed 
that the country has failed to consistently implement political 
decisions, specific laws and regulations or even oral agreements with 
the UNHCR to establish a system of refugee protection and 
evaluation.167 
Malaysia’s deficiencies in asylum processing act as a 
counterexample to what the international community characterizes as 
a safe third country. Similar to the International Court of Justice’s 
reasoning in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that a third country was 
improper because there was no guarantee that asylum applications 
would be considered fairly and properly due to processing 
deficiencies,168 the failure of the Malaysian system to protect against 
the dangers of internal corruption and chain refoulement suggest that 
Malaysia would not be a proper third country.169 Furthermore, similar 
to the reasoning of the UNHCR that hallmarks of a safe third 
country include applicants being given information about their 
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process and access to a fair and impartial system of asylum 
determination and appeal,170 reports indicating that detainees must 
resort to bribery to gain access to outside resources intimate that 
Malaysia lacks the internal system needed to meet international 
standards.171 
VII. CAN DOMESTIC REGULATIONS TRUMP INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS? 
Australia’s Constitution dictates that treaty ratification is the 
function of the Commonwealth Executive,172 while the passage of 
laws affecting the Commonwealth is a function of the 
Commonwealth Parliament.173 Because of this separation of powers, 
a treaty is not incorporated into domestic law unless it is 
implemented by legislation.174 This concept has traditionally been 
known as dualism.175 A dualist system requires international laws to 
be translated to domestic regulations in order to take effect.176 
Without such execution, litigants would have no cognizable claim in 
national courts based on international provisions.177 
In the vast majority of cases, statutory construction 
circumvents problems related to incorporation.178 It is 
uncontroverted that a country has the sovereign power to determine 
the means by which international agreements are implemented 
                                                 
170 See Refugees Without an Asylum Country, supra note 101. 
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domestically.179 The principle that ambiguities in legislation should be 
construed in accordance with treaty obligations circumvents the 
majority of conflicts between the international and domestic fields.180 
However, under a system that requires incorporation for treaty 
provisions to take on the force of law, it is theoretically possible to 
change the direct obligations which a treaty would impose by 
amending Australian domestic law. 
Just such an amendment was proposed after the High Court 
ruled against the Malaysian deal.181 On September 21, 2011, a bill to 
amend the Migration Act of 1958 was introduced in the Australian 
House of Representatives.182 The purpose of this bill was to “replace 
the existing framework in the Migration Act for taking offshore entry 
persons to another country.”183 The bill called for the repeal of 
section 198A, the basis for the High Court’s 2011 ruling against the 
Malaysia deal.184 In place of this component, a new section would 
provide that “the designation of a country to be an offshore 
processing country need not be determined by reference to the 
international obligations or domestic law of that country.”185 
The proposed amendment to the Migration Act would 
circumvent the specific ruling of the High Court which disallowed 
the Malaysian deal.186 However, case law indicates that despite this 
incorporation requirement, treaties still impose some indirect 
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obligations absent being implemented by legislation.187 In Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, a Malaysian immigrant was 
ordered deported after being convicted of possessing heroin.188 The 
Federal Court held that the deportation order had been improperly 
issued because of a failure to consider the hardship to Teoh’s wife 
and her children if Teoh was refused legal status.189 On review, the 
High Court affirmed the Federal Court’s decision, reasoning that the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child required the hardship suffered 
by the children to be considered.190 The High Court’s reasoning can 
be applied not only to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but 
also to other treaties to which Australia is a State Party.191 The High 
Court reasoned that, while international agreements must be 
incorporated into domestic law to have effect, ratification alone holds 
significance.192 The High Court held that Australia’s ratification of an 
international agreement raised a “legitimate expectation” that the 
standards set forth in the treaty would be followed.193 Absent a 
“statutory or executive indication to the contrary,” the obligations 
and rights annunciated in treaties are treated as directives on 
government policy.194 
Teoh contains no reference to what would constitute adequate 
“statutory or executive indication to the contrary.” Here, subsequent 
Australian case law is instructive. In Tien v. Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs, the Court interpreted sufficient “indications to 
the contrary” to refer to statements made at the time a treaty is 
entered into, “rather than to statements made years after the treaty 
came into force.”195 Take the case of Baldini v. Minister for Immigration 
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and Multicultural Affairs as a counter-example.196 In this case, a 
Ministerial Direction under s 499 of the Migration Act of 1958 was at 
issue.197 The Ministerial Directions indicate that the best interest of a 
child should be taken into account only in cases involving parental 
relationships.198 These Directions provide a narrower best interest 
analysis than provided for under the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.199 Nevertheless, the Court found that the Ministerial Direction 
provided sufficient “executive indication to the contrary.”200 The 
take-away from post-Teoh interpretations of “statutory or executive 
indication to the contrary” is that such indication must be clear and 
must exist at the time that international obligations are reduced to 
domestic law. 
Recent years have seen a retreat from the ruling in Teoh. Only 
a few short weeks after Teoh’s ruling, Australia’s then-existing 
Attorney General and Minister of Foreign Affairs issued a joint 
statement denouncing the High Court’s reasoning that 
unincorporated treaties impose a “legitimate expectation” under 
domestic law.201 What followed included not only multiple attempts 
to overturn the decision in the Australian Parliament, but also a 
retreat by the High Court itself from its language in Teoh.202 In Ex 
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parte Lam, a noncitizen who had established a family in Australia was 
subject to deportability based on a number of criminal convictions.203 
Based on the precedent in Teoh, it appeared that there was a 
“legitimate expectation” that the best interests of the children who 
would be left behind should be taken into account to comport with 
Australia’s treaty obligations.204 The High Court, however, expressed 
reservations about the language in Teoh.205 The notion was reiterated 
that, in the Australian system, treaty obligations that have not been 
enacted by legislation are not self-executing.206 The High Court 
suggested that Teoh might represent an incompatibility to this 
principle.207 Teoh’s continued significance, the High Court suggested, 
would depend on the limitations that are to be placed on the case’s 
language and on “the basis upon which Teoh rests.”208 
Despite a retreat at both the political and judicial levels, Teoh 
still represents good law in the Commonwealth.209 Furthermore, 
decisions by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal indicate that lower 
courts continue to follow the High Court’s reasoning in Teoh.210 In 
Yad Ram v. Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the Tribunal 
reviewed the denial of an application for a spousal visa.211 The 
Tribunal applied Teoh and found that the spousal visa should be 
issued based on the best interests of a child who would be affected 
by the decision.212 While Teoh remains contentious within Australia, 
standards annunciated by the international community bolster the 
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High Court’s decision.213 The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties indicates that a country’s domestic laws cannot provide a 
justification for an international treaty violation.214 The International 
Law Commission of the United Nations has further indicated that a 
country’s legislation being deemed ‘wrongful’ is governed by 
international law.215 This character of “wrongfulness” is not affected 
if a law is deemed proper within a country.216 
The continued existence of Teoh indicates that amending 
Australia’s domestic refugee law would not be an effective means to 
circumvent obligations under the Refugee Convention. As the High 
Court in Teoh indicated, while an amendment to the refugee 
processing system can properly alter the means by which asylum 
claims are adjudicated, the ends which result from the process must 
nevertheless comport with the standards and obligations delineated in 
the Refugee Convention.217 Furthermore, international standards 
delineated by such instruments as the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties appear to specifically address and prohibit nations from 
circumventing their international obligations by changing their 
internal laws.218 The weight of such standards indicates that any 
amendment designed to allow for an improper third party deal will be 
in violation of Australia’s international obligations. While altering the 
Migration Act would overcome the immediate blockade by 
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CLR at 289. 
218 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 214, at art. 
27. 
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overturning the High Court’s 2011 ruling, international standards 
indicate that Australia would still violate its obligations under the 
Refugee Convention. 
CONCLUSION 
An amendment to Australia’s Migration Act is not an antidote 
to the Malaysian deal. While amending Section 198A of the Migration 
Act has the effect of overturning the discrete High Court ruling 
declaring the Malaysian deal improper, Australia’s international 
obligations remain. 
Certain questions remain unanswered. The conclusions of 
this comment are based on the continued vitality of the High Court’s 
holding in Teoh that Australia’s ratification of an international treaty, 
in the absence of statutory or executive indication to the contrary, 
raises a “legitimate expectation” that the standards set forth in the 
treaty will be followed.219While Teoh still stands as good law in the 
Commonwealth, the High Court’s language in Lam and the 
Executive’s issuance of a statement denouncing Teoh, leave the 
“legitimate expectation” standard on shaky grounds.220 
Further, only the shortcomings in third party schemes have 
been addressed. It has been argued that a country such as Malaysia, 
which is not a State Party to the Refugee Convention and whose 
system of immigration processing is riddled with problems, cannot 
constitute a proper third country. While this comment has suggested 
that certain standards of asylum processing might bring a country up 
to international standards of human rights, a discussion of what 
would generally be considered a safe third country is beyond the 
scope of this discussion. 
                                                 
219 See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183 
CLR at 289. 
220 See The Administrative Decisions (Effect of International 
Instruments) Bill of 1995, (Cth)(Austl.); Administrative Decisions (Effect of 
International Instruments) Bill of 1997, (Cth)(Austl.); Administrative Decisions 
(Effect of International Instruments) Bill of 1999, (Cth)(Austl). 
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The Refugee Convention emphasizes that its State Parties are 
sovereign states which are nevertheless part of an international 
community.221 While the means by which protection is provided to 
refugees is the province of domestic law, to determine the ends that 
are ultimately met a member state must look outwards to its role as 
an actor on the international stage. 
 
                                                 
221 See UNHCR, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol: Signing On Could Make All The Difference, UN REFUGEE AGENCY (Aug. 
2001), http://www.unhcr.org/3bbdb0954.html. 
